

DDoS Mitigation in the NREN Environment Workshop

**GEANT Information & Infrastructure Security Team** 

**Evangelos Spatharas** 


DDoS Mitigation Workshop Vienna, November 10<sup>th</sup> 2015



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
- DDoS
  - Statistics
- How to Prevent
  - Understand your Network
  - Network Architecture Zones
  - Modular Firewall
- How to Detect
  - NetFlow Monitoring and Alerting
  - NetFlow Alternatives Log Monitoring
- How to Mitigate
  - ACLs
  - RTBH
  - BGP Flowspec
- The Future of BGP Flowspec
  - Firewall on Demand
  - NSHaRP Fully Integration
- Q&A





# D(D)oS – Not Just in Fiction Movies


#### <u>GÉANT</u>



• DNS, NTP, SMPT and other amplification attacks..




# **How to Protect Against DDoS?**










# **Defending GÉANT**






















# **Preventative Controls – Patch Scanning and Management**





#### Number of Vulnerable System by OS


- Asset management
- Areas of attention
- Monthly scans

#### Top 15 Vulnerable Systems for the current month

- By criticality
- Prioritize and remediate weakest ones first
- Monthly scans










## **Detective Controls – NetFlow Monitoring**





#### **Detective Controls – NetFlow E-mail Alerts**

Dear NREN. We have detected a Communication with blacklisted hosts event affecting your network. All the information pertaining to it can be found below: #Start Time: 2015-10-30 00:22:11 UTC #Protocol: TCP #Source IP: 110.30 #Target IPs: .52.61 #Ports: 56118 #Evidence: Source IP; Source port; Destination IP; Destination port; Protocol; Timestamp; Duration; Transferred; Packets; Flags; Source AS; Destination AS 7.110.30;80; 52.61;56118;TCP;2015-10-30 00:22:11.419;0;2840000;2000;.A...; \_\_\_\_\_ If you wish to reply to this email please leave the subject unaltered so the ticket can be updated accordingly. If no response is received, this ticket will be automatically closed after 5 working days Regards, GEANT CERT cert@oc.geant.net (PGP Key ID: 99833085 / Fingerprint: 3CBF F211 8305 635D 5839 BB27 BA6B F34A 9983 3085) Phone no.: +44 (0)1223 866 140




CRITICAL 🥕	HIGH 🥕	MEDIUM 🧪	LOW 🥕	INFORMATION 🥕
ANOMALY		HTTPDICT		
DOS				
RDPDICT				
SSHDICT				
TELNET				



## **Detective Controls – Login Rate Monitorin + Iptables + ...**

 index=nix\_hosts\_apache "Login failed for user\*" | stats\_count(src\_IPv4) by host | search count> 1000



- 2. iptables -I INPUT 5 -m limit --limit 10000/min -j LOG --log-prefix "Possible DDoS: " --log-level 7
- Nagios plugins?


# Mitigation







## Mitigation Controls – ACLs + RTBH + BGP Flowspec



- Doesn't scale
- Time consuming
- Granular
- Less coarse
- Service filtering

- Scalable
- Fast implementation
- No granularity
- Too coarse
- Wide support

## Scalable

- Fast implementation
- Granular
- Less coarse
- No support from older OSs

#### **ACLs- Chain Architecture**



#### Chain architecture

- Head → Middle → Tail
- Auditing
- Troubleshooting
- Deployment





```
Gmx1.vie.at.re0> show route community 20965:0008
inet.O: 557244 destinations, 2424476 routes (557168 active, 12 holddown, 193 hidden)
- = Active Route, - = Last Active, * = Both
    144.64/32 *[BGP/170] 36wld 16:17:06, localpref 100, from 62.40.
                       AS path: I, validation-state: unverified
                     > to 192.0.2.101 via dsc.0
 -.179.255/32 *[BGP/170] 3wld 15:11:53, localpref 200, from 62.40.
                     AS path: 2108 ?, validation-state: unverified > to 192.0.2.101 via dsc.0
  .180.25/32
                    *[BGP/170] 4w3d 18:38:48, localpref 200, from 62.40.
                       AS path: 2200 I, validation-state: unverified
                     > to 192.0.2.101 via dsc.0
                     [BGP/170] 5w5d 14:37:08, localpref 200, from 62.40.
AS path: 2200 I, validation-state: unverified
                     > to 192.0.2.101 via dsc.0
    .243.59/32 *[BGP/170] 1d 21:19:46, localpref 200, from 62.40
                     AS path: 2108 ?, validation-state: unverified > to 192.0.2.101 via dsc.0
  3.203.243.158/32 *[BGP/170] 1d 21:20:16, localpref 200, from 62.40.
                     AS path: 2108 ?, validation-state: unverified > to 192.0.2.101 via dsc.0
                    *[BGP/170] 3d 00:21:49, localpref 200, from 62.40.000
   2.218.101/32
                       AS path: 2847 51172 I, validation-state: unverified
                     > to 192.0.2.101 via dsc.0
                     [BGP/170] 3d 00:21:49, localpref 200, from 62.40. AS path: 2847 51172 I, validation-state: unverified
                     > to 192.0.2.101 via dsc.0
             s@mx1.vie.at.re0> show firewall filter RTBH-count
Filter: RTBH-count
Counters:
                                                                                   Packets
                                                            Bytes
RTBH-count
                                                   2246512664360
                                                                               2669500087
```


#### **Statistics**

- 6 RTBH-ed destinations
- 2+ billions of packets blocked

Counters reset every month



# fod.geant.net




Developed and designed by






### **FoD WEB GUI**






### **FoD WEB GUI**












## FoD – How Do we Envision it to Work



# **Demo Time!**





## What do YOU think?



What do YOU think?







# Thank you

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