
SeVen: A Selective Defense for Low-Rate Application Layer DDoS Attacks

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








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TCP SYN Flood

High traffic loads;
Affects all services;
Effective mitigation mechanisms








- Small traffic loads: one computer can shut down a web-server;
- Traffic similar to legitimate clients;
- Can target a single service leaving the remaining sevices undisturbed;
- Tools available for carrying out attacks and very simple to use (even by amateurs);
- Few defenses: IP filters, deny services to slow clients, etc.
- High traffic loads;
- Affects all services;
- Effective mitigation mechanisms





Slowloris / POST

TCP SYN Flood

nisms



Transport


Network





• In 2013, **37.2% of all** DDoS exploited the HTTP protocol.


"Profit-driven cybercriminals pay much closer attention to hackernomics, using the **least amount of resources** to cause the **maximum damage** or disruption to victims. This is why we should **expect application layer attacks to become the most prevalent attacks now and in the future.**"


Source: http://www.nsfocus.com/SecurityReport/
















Fatal for connection based web-servers such as Apache.

Why are these attacks so effective?

Slots



Why are these attacks so effective?



- **POST** (also know as RUDY R You Dead Yet)
- SlowRead (also effective on event based webservers such as NGinx)
- GET Flood (high traffic load)


• Monitor the number of established connections with the server.



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 If N less than the máximum number of connections, then accept new connections.
 New Req




• If **N** is equal to the maximum number of connections, then select requests:





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


- Decide if the this new request is going to be processed;
- If so, then decide which one of the existing requests should be removed.

SeVen is a Selective Verification Tool.

- SeVen is agnostic with respect to the attack:
- When the web-server is overloaded SeVen allows new request to be processed.


Why does SeVen work?




Why does SeVen work?



Other instances of SeVen








- Carried out a
 Slowloris attack throughout the country.
- No automatic defenses was able to detect our attack.
- The attack could succesfully make the target web-server unvailable to legitimate clients.

General Set-up


- Apache 2.4
 - Buffer: 200 positions
 - Timeout: 40s
- SeVen
 - Buffer: 200 positions
- Time of Experiment 10 hours
- Measurements
 - Availability (Av)
 - Time to Service (TTS)

We used existing attacker tools and used Siege to emulate clients.

Attacker Traffic – Slowloris Attack



Client Traffic – Slowloris Attack



	Not using SeVen		Using SeVen	
	Availability	TTS	Availability	TTS
No Attack	100%	0.01s	100%	0.11s
Slowloris	0.0%	∞	98.85%	0.15s
POST	0.0%	∞	97.25%	0.05s

Slowloris

No Attack		Under Attack	
Memory	CPU	Memory	CPU
0.5%	0.9%	1%	1%

Conclusions and Future Work

- SeVen is a generic strategy for mitigating a large number of Application-Layer DDoS attacks.
- Our experiments demonstrate that SeVen is effective requiring very little computation power.

Future Work

- We are understanding better the impacts of SeVen on QoS.
- We are continuing to improve our implementations and testing its reliability.
- We are considering the use of SeVen in Application Layer DDoS exploiting other services, such as VoIP.

Questions?