

AARC Assurance Profiles

Addressing Federated Security Incident Response

Hannah Short


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Kantara April 7th, 2016







AARC https://aarc-project.eu





- Authorisation and Authentication for Research and Collaboration
- European Commission funded project
- 2 years, 2015/17
- 20 partners from NRENs, E-Infrastructures & Libraries
- Builds on existing AAIs and on production federated infrastructures.

The AARC vision is to create a future in which e-Infrastructures and new research collaborations cooperate seamlessly on top of a scalable and interoperable AAI.

https://aarc-project.eu






- Global scope, though Europe-focused
- Many moving parts...
- Must ensure any policy adoption/technical changes are:
 - Easy to adopt
 - Legally acceptable
 - Financially beneficial/neutral
- AARC2 proposal submitted
 - 2017/19
 - 27 partners (so growing!)
 - Focus on users



AARC






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Policy and best practices harmonisation





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
Policy and best practices harmonisation



 Areas identified jointly by e-infrastructures, research infrastructures and NRENs

policy gaps

Tasks chosen around perceived





Policy and best practices harmonisation Assurance Gaps



Common Baseline Level of Assurance

- Multiple LoA profiles exist but tend to be localised & require considerable negotiation to adopt
- Based on empirical studies, what is a reasonable baseline of assurance to expect from R&E IdPs?

Security Incident Response

- Can we facilitate collaborative incident response?
- Is there a way to make this attractive to participants?



Minimum LoA Research community interviews



- Interviewed 6 research infrastructures
 - CLARIN (language research)
 - DARIAH (arts and humanities)
 - ELIXIR (life science)
 - LIGO (physics)
 - photon/neutron facilities (physics)
 - WLCG (physics)
- Interviewed 2 e-infrastructures
 - EGI
 - PRACE
- Interview results: <u>https://wiki.geant.org/x/nQHbAg</u>



- 1. The accounts in the Home Organisations must each belong to a known individual
- 2. Persistent user identifiers (i.e., no reassign of user identifiers)
- 3. Documented identity vetting procedures (not necessarily face-to-face)
- 4. Password authentication (with some good practices)
- 5. Departing user's eduPersonAffiliation must change promptly
- 6. Self-assessment (supported with specific guidelines)

The document: <u>https://wiki.geant.org/x/wIEVAw</u>



Minimum LoA Next steps




- REFEDS working group
- Likely that each minimum LoA requirement will be a separate Entity Category



Policy and best practices harmonisation The chain of assurance






Credit to David Groep (Nikhef) for this slide

Security Incident Response The problem




- Clearly an inviting vector of attack
- The lack of a centralised support system for security incident response is an identified risk to the success of eduGAIN
- We will need participants to collaborate during incident response this may be outside their remit




It all seems like common sense...





... but in reality





Security Incident Response The solution





- Attacks inevitable 😕
- But we can make security capability transparent and build relationships between organisations and people ⁽²⁾

...We need a trust framework!

Security Incident Response A history and the future



	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
FIM4R Paper								
Security for Collaborating Infrastructures (SCI)								
REFEDS Working Group								
AARC								
Sirtfi v1.0 Published				1				
First Round Deployment								
RFC								
AARC2								
Second Round Deployment								

Security Incident Response FIM4R



- Issue of IdM raised by IT leaders from EIROforum labs (Jan 2011)
 - CERN, EFDA-JET, EMBL, ESA, ESO, ESRF, European XFEL and ILL
- These laboratories, as well as national and regional research organizations, face similar challenges
- Prepared a paper that documents common requirements <u>https://cdsweb.cern.ch/record/1442597</u>

"Security procedures and incident response would need to be reviewed. Today, each resource provider is for example responsible for terminating access by known compromised identities. With identity federation, this responsibility will be shifted to the IdP though resource providers will insist on the ability to revoke access." "Such an identity federation in the High Energy Physics (HEP) community would rely on:
A well-defined framework to ensure sufficient trust and security among the different IdPs and relying parties."



- A collaborative activity of information security officers from large-scale infrastructures
 - EGI, OSG, PRACE, EUDAT, CHAIN, WLCG, XSEDE, ...
- Laid the foundations for a *Trust framework*
 - Enable interoperation (security teams)
 - Manage cross-infrastructure security risks
 - Develop policy standards
 - Especially where not able to share identical security policies

- A Trust Framework for Security Collaboration among Infrastructures David Kelsey¹ STFC Rutherford Appleton Laborate Harwell Oxford, Dideot OX11 0OX, UK E-mail: david.kelsey8stfc.ac.uk Keith Chadwick, Irwin Gaines P.O. Rox 509, Batavia, IL 60510-5011, USA E-mail: chadwick#fnal.gov. gaines#fnal.gov David L. Groep 201 Nikhef, National Institute for Subatomic Physics P.O. Box 41882, 1059 DB Amsterdam, The Netherlands E-mail: davidg@nikhef.nl http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1026-6696 Urpo Kalla CSC - IT Center for Science Ltd. P.O. Box 405, FI-02101 Espoo, Finland E-mail: Urpo, Naila@csc. fi Christos Kapellopoulos GRNET 56. Mesogion Av. 11527, Athens, Greece E-mail: skanot@admin.grnet.gr James Marstelle Pitteburgk Supercomputer Center 300 S. Craig Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA E-mail: jan@psc.edu
- Proceedings of the ISGC 2013 conference <u>http://pos.sissa.it/archive/conferences/179/011/ISGC%202013_011.pdf</u>

Pos

Security Incident Response Sirtfi



- The SCI document formed the basis for the Security Incident
 Response Trust Framework for Federated Identity
- ✓ Articulate framework requirements
- ✓ Complete Community Consultation
- ✓ Publish Sirtfi framework
- ✓ Create Training material
- Confirm metadata extensions
- Begin adoption
- Support filtering based on Sirtfi

Security Incident Response Sirtfi



Operational Security

• Require that a security incident response capability exists with sufficient authority to mitigate, contain the spread of, and remediate the effects of an incident.

Incident Response

- Assure confidentiality of information exchanged
- · Identify trusted contacts
- Guarantee a response during collaboration

Traceability

- Improve the usefulness of logs
- Ensure logs are kept in accordance with policy

Participant Responsibilities

Confirm that end users are aware of an appropriate AUP



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- Based on the InCommon security contactType
- What to include?
 - Individual or group email contact? Recommend generic
 - Telephone number in case critical infrastructure down? Would that really help?
 - PGP Key?
- The specification is flexible, section 2.3.2.2 of <u>https://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-metadata-2.0-os.pdf</u>



- Asserting compliance via standard <u>OASIS</u> specification
- Applied to register with IANA

<attr:EntityAttributes>
<saml:Attribute
NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri"
Name="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:attribute:assurance-certification">
<saml:AttributeValue>https://refeds.org/sirtfi</saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
</attr:EntityAttribute>

Security Incident Response Benefits of Sirtfi




IdPs Gain access to useful services that only allow authentication from Sirtfi compliant IdPs SPs Gain **users** whose home organisations only allow authentication at Sirtfi compliant SPs

Guarantee an efficient and effective **response** from partner organisations during incident response

Raise the bar in operational **security** across eduGAIN

Security Incident Response Find out more – Home Page





The Security Incident Response Trust Framework for Federated Identity (Sirtfi) aims to enable the coordination of incident response across federated organisations. This assurance framework comprises a list of assertions which an organisation can attest in order to be declared Sirtfi compliant.


REFEDS' Sirtfi Working Group has been active since 2014 and combines expertise in operational security and incident response policy from across the REFEDS community. Work to publish and implement the Sirtfi Trust Framework is supported by the AARC Project.



https://refeds.org/sirtfi

Security Incident Response Find out more – Technical Wiki






https://wiki.refeds.org/display/SIRTFI/SIRTFI+Home



- Communities are happy with self assessment as long as the group is relatively small
- The eduGAIN world is not small!
- Some use cases require peer review
- At a larger scale automation will be necessary
- How do we ensure the correct people complete the assessment?

eduGAIN Stats Federations: 38 All entities: 3157 IdPs: 2007 SPs: 1151



Recording Adoption Self Assessment

 Spinoff project from LoA/Sirtfi activities to develop a self assessment tool*


Best Practices Defined

- Optional Peer Review
- Integration with SAML Metadata
- Adoption Monitoring
- Feedback has been positive, but must ensure design scales
- Unclear how this tool will be developed, looking to the next round of AARC and GEANT Projects

* https://docs.google.com/document/d/10kguCdxWn38z_EGRnrdjCl4GSeO44zFGeXWHGmzz270



Adoption of Best Practices Recorded









- The AARC Project aims to ensure that identity federation succeeds, both in technologies and policies
- Measures to address perceived assurance gaps were included in the Policies and Best Practices Harmonisation Work Package
- Community based interviews have defined a minimum acceptable LoA, this will be the basis for an assurance profile
- There is a clear assurance gap in federated security, which is being addressed by a trust framework
- A Self-Assessment tool would prove valuable for multiple use cases to scale adoption



Appendix, Sirtfi Assertions



- [OS1] Security patches in operating system and application software are applied in a timely manner.
- [OS2] A process is used to manage vulnerabilities in software operated by the organisation.
- [OS3] Mechanisms are deployed to detect possible intrusions and protect information systems from significant and immediate threats
- [OS4] A user's access rights can be suspended, modified or terminated in a timely manner.
- [OS5] Users and Service Owners (as defined by <u>ITIL</u> [ITIL]) within the organisation can be contacted.
- [OS6] A security incident response capability exists within the organisation with sufficient authority to mitigate, contain the spread of, and remediate the effects of a security incident.



- [IR1] Provide security incident response contact information as may be requested by an R&E federation to which your organization belongs.
- [IR2] Respond to requests for assistance with a security incident from other organisations participating in the Sirtfi trust framework in a timely manner.
- [IR3] Be able and willing to collaborate in the management of a security incident with affected organisations that participate in the Sirtfi trust framework.
- [IR4] Follow security incident response procedures established for the organisation.
- [IR5] Respect user privacy as determined by the organisations policies or legal counsel.
- [IR6] Respect and use the <u>Traffic Light Protocol</u> [TLP] information disclosure policy.





- [TR1] Relevant system generated information, including accurate timestamps and identifiers of system components and actors, are retained and available for use in security incident response procedures.
- [TR2] Information attested to in [TR1] is retained in conformance with the organisation's security incident response policy or practices.



- [PR1] The participant has an Acceptable Use Policy (AUP).
- [PR2] There is a process to ensure that all users are aware of and accept the requirement to abide by the AUP, for example during a registration or renewal process.

Thank you Any Questions?

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