Expression of REFEDS RAF assurance components for identities derived from social media accounts

Publication Date: 2018-02-23
Authors: David Groep (ed.); Jens Jensen; Mikael Linden; Uros Stevanovic; Davide Vaghetti
Grant Agreement No.: 730941
Work Package: NA3
Task Item: TNA3.3
Lead Partner: Nikhef
Document Code: AARC-G041

© GÉANT on behalf of the AARC project.
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community’s Horizon2020 Programme under Grant Agreement No. 730941 (AARC2).

Abstract
Infrastructure Proxies may convey assurance information derived from multiple sources, one of which may be ‘social identity’ sources. This guidance explains under which conditions combination of assurance information and augmentation of identity data within the Infrastructure Proxy should result in assertion of the REFEDS Assurance Framework components “unique identifier”, and when it may be appropriate to assert the “identity proofing” component value low.
1. Introduction

The Infrastructure Proxies that are a key feature of the AARC Blueprint architecture [AARC-BPA] typically convey user information that has an authentication assurance derived from multiple sources, i.e. is the result of a “combined assurance evaluation” by the Infrastructure Proxy. In interoperability scenarios, the proxy is expected to associate an assurance profile with the authentication assertion provided to its ‘customers’, and, when required, to assert the assurance component values defined in the REFEDS Assurance Framework [RAF] specification.

In the cases where the Infrastructure Proxy has derived the authentication in whole or principally from ‘social media’ identity providers (such as Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.), the assurance profile provided with the authentication assertion will usually be “AARC-Assam” (as specified in [AARC-G021]) – although nothing precludes the proxy from using supplemental business processes and combinations that might result in other assurance profiles.

Yet when the primary source of identity is social, and no additional information is available, the question arises whether any of the specific assurance components specified in the REFEDS RAF are also applicable. In particular this concerns the ‘unique identifier’ (ID/unique) and the identity vetting component based on provided-email-address only (IAP/low).

2. Social media account qualities

Many social media providers encourage unique, non-duplicate identifiers that are associated with real people. In particular Facebook and LinkedIn publish a policy that would make both duplicate and ‘fake’ accounts a violation of the terms of use. Yet in practice we observe that there is a large fraction of duplicate accounts (up to 10% even in Facebook, which stipulates a one account per person requirement explicitly in its terms and conditions) and accounts not related to real known people (up to 3% in Facebook).

Obviously there may also be more than one person with the same name.

Neither duplicates nor non-personal accounts would pose much of an issue to an Infrastructure when the social account is used as an authenticating factor to an identified persona already known in the Infrastructure or community: by implication, there is an identity

---

1 See e.g. page 7 in the Facebook statement of Q3 2017, <https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2017/Q3/Q3-‘17-Earnings-call-transcript.pdf>: “This quarter, we implemented a new methodology to help identify duplicate accounts. As a result, we increased our estimates for duplicate accounts to approximately 10% of worldwide MAUs from our previously disclosed estimate of 6%. Duplicate accounts are those that we believe are used by the same person and represent real activity and engagement on Facebook. We have also increased our estimate for inauthentic accounts to approximately 2-3% of worldwide MAUs. Inauthentic accounts are largely those that are used for spam and other policy-violating reasons.”
Expression of REFEDS RAF assurance components for identities derived from social media accounts

associated with a known person. In all these cases, then, we shall refer to the account as a known “Infrastructure identity”, which in itself will have the properties required in the REFEDS RAF from a “unique identifier”, namely:

1. **User account belongs to a single natural person**
2. **The person and the credential they are assigned is traceable i.e. the CSP knows who they are and can contact them**
3. **The user identifier will not be re-assigned**
4. **The user identifier is eduPersonUniqueID or one of the pairwise identifiers recommended by REFEDS**

In particular requirement (2) can then be satisfied based on Infrastructure and community registries. To meet requirements (1), even in this case additional controls may be necessary. These controls can take the form of a policy statement, e.g. by adding to the infrastructure AUP that "I won't use a shared account to log in or disclose my credentials to anyone" and to some extent count on the implicit understanding by qualified Infrastructure users that accounts and authenticators are valuable. Excluding bots should be relatively easy: first, captchas tend to do a good enough job even if they annoy legitimate users, and second, while bots can join mailing lists, they have not yet, as far as we know, evolved the sophistication to join research communities and access services through CSPs.

In absence of additional information to support (1), for Infrastructure identities whose accounts are solely backed by social media identity sources and nothing else, the basic requirements of REFEDS RAF “ID/unique” cannot be met. Based on the publicly known account qualities, and without compensatory controls, neither (1) "single natural person" nor (2) “… the CSP knows who they are …” can be satisfied. The duplicate accounts are not a critical issue in this respect, but particularly (2) would not be compatible with fake accounts, that are not ‘known’ to the credential service provider without linking to another identity or identifier.

Additional heuristics can be applied by the Proxy to help meet these requirements. One valid option would be to verify control over a personal email address associated with a well-known and reputable organisation (e.g. the users home university or research institute on a managed domain, which would allow users with an institutional email address but no institutional IdP that releases attributes to participate in the Infrastructure). Such heuristics could even include behavioural analysis, or take other forms. The business logic thereof is to be determined by both technical and policy factors.

Yet without such further processing it would be a violation of the REFEDS RAF specification to include “https://refeds.org/assurance/ID/unique” in the assurance attribute or claim provided by the Proxy to third parties.
3. RAF component recommendations

The above-listed considerations lead to the following guidance on asserting assurance component values:

| The Infrastructure ID is based solely on a social account, and no additional information has been collected and no heuristics applied to change the assurance | Assert profile AARC-Assam  
DO NOT assert any REFEDS RAF component values |
|---|---|
| The Infrastructure ID is co-based on a social ID, but there are linked identities, either provided externally or based on information independently obtained by the proxy through heuristic or other business logic, that provide additional keys to ‘who they are’ and that the user is a single natural person and not sharing the account. | Assert profile AARC-Assam  
ALSO assert  
https://refeds.org/assurance/ID/unique |
| The Infrastructure ID is co-based as above, but in addition either the Proxy or an ‘upstream’ identity source provides a valid email address through which the user can reasonably be expected to be reached | Assert profile AARC-Assam  
ALSO assert BOTH  
https://refeds.org/assurance/ID/unique and  
https://refeds.org/assurance/IAP/low |

With this combination, the recipient of assurance information from a Proxy can derive unambiguously the status of an account which is based wholly or partially on social media authentication.
# Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 2
2. Social media account qualities ...................................................................................... 2
3. RAF component recommendations .............................................................................. 4

Table of Contents .............................................................................................................. 5

References .......................................................................................................................... 6
Expression of REFEDS RAF assurance components for identities derived from social media accounts

References

RAF  https://wiki.refeds.org/display/GROUPS/Assurance+Working+Group visited 20 February 2018
AARC-G021  Exchange of specific assurance information between Infrastructures AARC Guideline 021, https://aarc-project.eu/guidelines/aarc-g021/