


# WLCG SOC WG

WLCG Security Operations Center Working Group


*David Crooks, Liviu Vâlsan*



# Landscape

Only one strategy:  
Leveraging our community to secure together its  
individual members

—  
Both for threat intelligence and incident response



Romain Wartel

*Computing for High Energy Physics 2019,  
Adelaide, Australia, November 2019*

SIG-ISM/WISE October 2020


# Security Operations Centres

- Allowing WLCG sites to digest and make active use of threat intelligence is a cornerstone of the WLCG security strategy
- The WLCG Security Operations Centre WG was established to enable the deployment of security tools to enable this
  - But also including members from the wider academic research community
- The working group is mandated to create reference designs to allow sites to
  - Ingest security monitoring data
  - Enrich, store and visualize this security data
  - Alert based on matches between the stored data and threat intelligence
    - Indicators of Compromise or IoCs

# Areas of work

- Technology stack needed to actively use threat intelligence
- Integrations with existing tools
- *Not* in scope is operational use of threat intelligence
  - Existing operational security teams

# Technology stack: Initial Model



SIG-ISM/WISE October 2020

# Technology stack: initial model

Stage	Component	Notes
Threat intelligence	<a href="#">MISP</a>	Cornerstone of model; focused around central MISP instance hosted at CERN
Data sources	<a href="#">Zeek</a>	Highly detailed but requires dedicated hardware
	<a href="#">Netflow</a>	Readily available at many sites but offers less information than Zeek
Data pipelines	<a href="#">Logstash</a> + <a href="#">Filebeat</a> + JSON logs (e.g. Zeek)	Basic pipeline provided by WG
	<a href="#">Logstash</a> + <a href="#">Elasticflow</a> (Netflow)	Dedicated pipeline for netflow/sflow
Storage and Visualisation	<a href="#">Elasticsearch</a>	Share deployment configs within group
	<a href="#">Kibana</a>	Share dashboard processes
Alerting	<a href="#">Correlation scripts</a>	Generalised version of CERN scripts
	<a href="#">Elastalert</a>	Rule based alerts; share typical configs

# CERN MISP

- CERN is currently operating 5 different instances:
  - Main CERN instance (~2.3 M IoCs)
  - Academic (Worldwide LHC Computing Grid (WLCG)) central MISP instance (~1.2 M IoCs)
  - Development MISP instance used for MISP development (CERN is an active contributor) and for validating new MISP releases
  - Two community specific MISP instances
- CERN is currently actively sharing threat intelligence with ~570 peer organisations

# Academic MISP instance

- Hub and spoke intelligence sharing structure based around instance hosted at CERN
  - Benefit from CERN trust relationships and experience
- Mostly TLP:GREEN and TLP:WHITE
  - Information that is limited to the community or public
- TLP:AMBER events produced by CERN
  - Information that should only be shared with trusted security contacts
  - Important to allow sharing of intelligence safely about ongoing incidents
- Rules of participation document has been prepared for this service



# Academic MISP instance

- Access to the Academic MISP instance governed by a Threat Intelligence Sharing Agreement
  - Rules of engagement
  - Use of the threat intelligence shared using this instance
- Information usage policy
  - Threat intel exclusively for the benefit of the trusted parties
  - Solely for the purpose of detecting, containing, mitigating and resolving security attacks

# Access to Threat Intelligence

- Commitments
  - Follow and obey the TLP guidelines and sharing restrictions
  - Follow and obey the SCIV2 trust framework assertions IR1-4
  - Follow and obey the information usage policy
  - Share back information whenever you believe it may be beneficial to a trusted party and are in a position to do so

# Threat intelligence & operational security

- Clarification of role of WG
- Draw a distinction between
  - the technologies, infrastructure and best practice used to share threat intelligence (focus of WG)
  - the threat intelligence itself and actual sharing of information in the course of operational security

# Recent developments

- STFC continuing to work on Cloud SOC using sflow from cloud routers
- Plans in place to deploy prototype Zeek instance
  - Somewhat delayed by COVID-19
- Integrate threat intelligence with STFC Information Security
- Nikhef revisiting prototype Zeek deployment
- In contact with Triumf who have a project to deploy Zeek
- Discussions ongoing to integrate our threat intelligence with Jisc MISP

# Deployment options

- How might we suggest proceeding with a wider roll out of this capability?
- Current direction is towards encouraging participation particularly within Tier-1s
- Envisage a focus by the WG on assisting individual sites with deployment

# Contact details

- Website
  - [wlcg-soc-wg.web.cern.ch](http://wlcg-soc-wg.web.cern.ch)
- Documentation
  - [wlcg-soc-wg-doc.web.cern.ch](http://wlcg-soc-wg-doc.web.cern.ch)
- Egroup
  - [wlcg-soc-wg@cern.ch](mailto:wlcg-soc-wg@cern.ch)
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