

# **EU Security Union - 2ND INFOSHARE**

NIS-2, CER, CRA: State of affairs and next steps

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Online Infoshare 11 January 2022

Public

### **Rules of engagement**

- This session is recorded
- Please mute
- Ask questions in the chat:
  - we will try to answer as many as possible, given time and expertise
- Time permitting we will have a short Q&A at the end of this infoshare
- Ask questions later:
  - Visit the wiki pages
  - Join SIG-ISM
  - Ask your CISO/Security officer/legal counselor
  - Ask your GÉANT partner relations representative
  - Ask the GN5-1 WP8 security team



# Agenda

13.00	Welcome and introduction	Cathrin Stover
13.10	Quick Summary	Alf Moens
13.15	The EU Security Union, what it is and where are we now?	Edit Herczog
13.35	Impact of NIS-2 for R&E	Alf Moens
13.45	What <u>you</u> need to do <u>now</u>	Alf Moens
13.55	What we will do together	
14.10	Questions and Answers, discussion	
14.25	Conclusions, Next steps and closing	



### **Quick Summary**

- NIS-2 directive has been published on 15th of December 2022, and will be in action within 21 months from the "entry in force":
- **4th of October** 2024: (January 4th 2023+ 21 months) latest, but with the Council Recommendation **to do it ASAP.**
- Standards are still 'negotiated' via comitology (delegated Act)
  - Cybersecurity Certification scheme
- Obligations are "logical", no real surprises



New EU Legal Framework

New EU Legislation A number of new EU regulations are due shortly, on security, data governace, data market and more.

#### NIS-2 Directive

The new security directive will directly impact GÉANT and the NRENs

Directive on the resilience of critical entities (<del>ECI/</del>CER)

European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre

Network of National Coordination Centers Joint Cyber Unit

EU Cyber Capacity Building Board EU Cybersecurity Act (2019) & Security Union 2020 – 2025 Strategy (July 2020) & Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade (December 2020)

Certain research areas identified that require heightened security measures: health, Earth observation and security research

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NIS -2 Directive

### What is it?

A directive to enforce the implementation of adequate security measures for information systems the society depends upon. Who is it for? Organisations in almost all sectors that are vital or important to keep society afloat.

### In or out of scope?

This directive is aimed to broaden the scope of the previous one and make it more explicit.

Impact on security Organisations will have to comply with international security standards and they will have to show compliance.

# Supervision and auditing

There will be a national supervising body that will also have the power to enforce compliance. Peer reviewing and external auditing are to be expected. Research and Education is intentionally included and mentioned, will be MS discretion.

## Essential or Important entity

### Oversight

- The entity is the sole provider of a service in a Member State
- The entity is critical because of its specific importance at national level or for a particular sector

Government Agency If you are a government agency you are within scope.

### TLD


If you are the registry of a TLD you are within scope

DNS DNS service


providers provides recursive or authoritative domain name resolution services to internet endusers and other DNS service providers

### Cloud and trust Services


### The EU Security Union is complex and overlaps with the EU Digital priorities



# **Timelines for NIS-2, CER, CRA**



## The Main Difference between NIS-2 CER and CRA



# What to negotiate during transposition: NREN-s and GÉANT

- Scope
  - Domain
    - Public Administration
    - Education
  - Qualification of Specific entities
    - Essential: Digital infrastructures are here
    - Important
- National Cyber Security Strategy (examples)
  - Governance Framework
  - Public Procurement Specification
  - Policy on the open Internet and Submarine cables
  - Policy on support to R&D Communities

Objective Minimize the burden and fragmentation

#### Suggestion

- 1. The opportunity to opt out is impossible
- 2. To be an important entitiy is not feasible (as definition of RI is very specific)
- 3. Among Essential types Digital Infrastructure is the best. (avoid CER additional requirements)

#### Conclusion

Member States will differ, coordination among NREN/s is recommended



# **Competent authorities and single points of contact**

- Competent autority will:
  - Decide upon who is in scope
  - Take care of registration of entities within scope
  - Have supervising task
- May not be the same supervisor/coordinator as for NIS-1 (mainly telco!)
- Cooperation at international level (for Member States):
  - Cooperation Group
  - CSIRT network
  - European cyber crisis liaison organisation network (EU-Cyclone)
  - ENISA

### Impact of NIS-2 for Research and Education: in scope or out-of-scope

#### Type of organisation

- Public Administration
- Registrar
- Internet exchange
- ...

Aim to be a digital infrstructure, either an essential or an important entity. Most NREN's should not be in scope of CER.

"The entity is the sole provider in a Member State of a service which is essential for the maintenance of critical societal or economic activities" (art. 2.2.b)

Essential or important? Same rules apply except the oversight Example of negotiations:

- Size\* of a <u>tld</u> determines whether registry is in/out scope
- However negotiations between Member States: NL 300.000+, D: 500+
- Scoping decisions are made on a national (Member State) level

"The entity is critical because of its specific importance at national ... level for the particular sector ..., or for other interdependent sectors" (art.2.2.e)

\*Caution The Size criteria is overruled by Article 2.2 "Regardless of their size…"

### **Cross border impact**

This is especially the case for GÉANT, Nordunet and possibly also for some research infrastructures

- Supervision
- Incidents with cross-border impact



### Article 21 Cybersecurity risk-management measures

"based on an all-hazards approach"

- a. Policies on risk analysis and information system security;
- b. incident handling;
- c. business continuity, such as backup management and disaster recovery, and crisis management;
- d. Supply chain security;
- e. Security in network and information systems acquisition, development and maintenance, including vulnerability handling and disclosure;

Security Measures

RISK analysis  $\rightarrow$ 

- f. policies and procedures to assess the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk-management measures;
- g. Basic cyber hygiene practices and training;
- h. Cryptography and, where appropriate, encryption;
- i. human resources security, access control policies and asset management;
- j. multi-factor authentication or continuous authentication solutions



# Information Security Standards



- ISO 27001 and 27002
- NIST
- Cybersecurity of 5G networks - EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measures
- Measures for TLD registries
- GÉANT Security Baseline
- National standards

#### Originally aimed at Telco's Commissioner Vestager (EC) Table 2- Toolbox measures and supporting actions Table 1 - Risk categories and scenarios (source: the EU coordinated risk assessment report) RISKS I - Risk scenarios **R1-**Misconfiguration of networks related to insufficient R2-Lack of access controls security measures may be contribute to the mitigation of mitigated by R3-Low product quality II - Risk scenarios related to 5G supply R4-Dependency on any single supplier within individual MITIGATING MEASURES chain networks or lack of diversity on nation-wide basis III - Risk scenarios R5- State interference through 5G supply chain **TECHNICAL MEASURES** STRATEGIC MEASURES related to modus R6- Exploitation of 5G networks by organised crime or operandi of main threat a) Regulatory powers a) Network security - baseline measures organised crime group targeting end-users actors b) Third party suppliers b) Network security - 5G specific measures c) Requirements related to suppliers' c) Diversification of suppliers IV - Risk scenarios d) Sustainability and diversity of 5G processes and equipment related to R7- Significant disruption of critical infrastructures or services supply and value chain d) Resilience and continuity interdependencies R8-Massive failure of networks due to interruption of electricity between 5G networks supply or other support systems and other critical systems enabled, supported or enable, assist or improve made effective with effectiveness of V - Risk scenarios R9-Exploitation of IoT (Internet of Things), handsets or smart related to end user devices devices SUPPORTING ACTIONS

### **Cybersecurity of 5G networks EU Toolbox of risk** mitigating measures





### **Strategic measures**

#### ... Technical measures

# TM01 Ensuring the application of baseline security requirements (secure network design and architecture);

TM02 Ensuring and evaluating the implementation of security measures in existing 5G standards;

#### TM03 Ensuring strict access controls;

TM04 Increasing the security of virtualised network functions;

TM05 Ensuring secure 5G network management, operation and monitoring;

TM06 Reinforcing physical security;

TM07 Reinforcing software integrity, update and patch management;

TM08 Raising the security standards in suppliers' processes through robust procurement conditions;

TM09 Using EU certification for 5G network components, customer equipment and/or suppliers' processes;

TM10 Using EU certification for other non 5G-specific ICT products and services (connected devices, cloud services);

TM11 Reinforcing resilience and continuity plans.

### **Additional measures**

SA01 guidelines and best practices on (network) security; SA02 testing and auditing capabilities at national and EU level;

SA03 Supporting and shaping 5G standardisation;

 $SA04 \ {\rm Developing\ guidance\ on\ the\ implementation\ of\ security\ measures\ in\ existing\ 5G\ standards;}$ 

# SA05 Ensuring the application of standard technical and organisational security measures through specific EU-wide certification scheme;

SA06 Exchanging best practices on the implementation of strategic measures, in particular national frameworks for assessing the risk profile of suppliers;

SA07 Improving coordination in incident response and crisis management;

SA08 Conducting audits of interdependencies (between 5G networks and other) critical services;

SA09 Enhancing cooperation, coordination and information sharing mechanisms;

SA10 Ensuring (5G deployment) projects supported with public funding take into account cybersecurity risks www.geant.org







Technical Guideline: Security Measures for Top-Level-Domain Name Registries

> Report – CG March 2022



Cybersecurity of 5G networks EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measures

CG Publication 01/2020





# **Good Security Practices**

- Risk management
- Basic Security requirements
  - Roles and responsibilities, some policies
  - System hardening
- Strict access control
- Network (and system) management, operation and monitoring
- Patch management
- Robust procurement conditions
- Resilience, continuity and recovery plans
- Incident response capabilities
- Information sharing



GÉAN

# What do we already know and have?

- Overview of agencies per member state: This is a good starting point to get in contact with national authorities. We will work on sharing the latest information
- GÉANT Security Baseline: helps you assess your status, easy to use, we can assist
- Policies, best practices, Risk management policy
- SIG-ISM: security management community

# What do we want to know?

- Coordinator per NREN
- Your status:
  - Your NIS-2-status
  - What you need




# NIS-2 agencies/Single-point-of-contact per member state

 Link from NIS coordination group plus examples: List of SPOCS & Competent authorities – NIS Directive <u>https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc\_id=536</u> 82



# **Quick Scans / assessments**

- Several NRENs perform maturity scans with their constituents
  - SURF, SIKT, JISC, ...
  - Some of these tools can be shared
- Some countries already have 'standards'
  - UK: cyber essentials
- Quick scan based on 5G networks toolkit
- Quick scan based on GÉANT Security Baseline



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# **Security Baselining**




Level	
1	Base
2	Advanced
3	Expert

What is the minimal set for security for a NREN? How are you doing compared to others? Let's benchmark



### **Security Baselining**

**Advanced** 30% of NRENs Solid security practices Some NRENs are already compliant, most implement just individual requirements



# 10% of NRENs

Sophisticated security programme Only a few NRENs are compliant This is a long-term goal to achieve

> **Baseline** 80% of NRENs Entry-level security The majority of NRENs ar already compliant



# Baseline, example,2.3 supplier management & 3.3 Business Continuity

NO2.3	Requirements	1	2	3
NO2.3.1	A supplier security policy is in place and accessible for staff involved in contracting suppliers.			
NO2.3.2	All suppliers have contracts stating relevant security aspects.			
NO2.3.3	All suppliers are assessed according to their criticality and business impact and listed at a central location.			
NO2.3.4	SLAs, SLA reporting, meeting notes and other documents to assess the suppliers' performance on a regular basis are available.			
NO2.3.5	Changes in the suppliers'_services are monitored on a regular basis			
NO2.3.6	Where appropriate, suppliers' services and products are audited or penetration_tested.			
NO2.3.7	Where appropriate, suppliers handling sensitive data have signed a <u>n</u> NDA.			


NO3.3	Requirements	1	2	3
NO3.3.1	A BCM process is defined, documented and implemented.			
NO3.3.2	A Business Continuity Manager responsible for the BCM process is assigned.			
NO3.3.3	A BCP exists, which covers at least disasters produced by power failure, fire and water.			
NO3.3.4	A list of managers responsible for handling disasters at any point in time is defined.			
NO3.3.5	The BCP covers all NREN-specific disasters from the GÉANT Disaster List.			
NO3.3.6	The organisation participates yearly in a crisis simulation, such as the GÉANT CLAW workshops.			
NO3.3.7	A manager on duty is assigned to be available on call 24/7/365.			

### **Security Baselining (example)**

### Security maturity

Current Maturity Score			core		
			Maturity		
Functions	Security Practices	Current	1	2	3
Policy and Leadership	Management Commitment and Mandate	1,58	0,33	0,25	1,00
Policy and Leadership	Internal Security Policy	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00
Policy and Leadership	Acceptable Use Policy	2,08	0,83	0,75	0,50
Policy and Leadership	Regulatory and Privacy	3,00	1,00	1,00	1,00
People	Training and Awareness	0,92	0,67	0,25	0,00
People	Personnel Management	1,58	0,83	0,50	0,25
People	Supplier Management	1,25	0,50	0,50	0,25
Threats	Risk Management	1,33	0,83	0,25	0,25
Threats	Incident Management	0,83	0,33	0,50	0,00
Threats	Business Continuity Management	1,08	0,83	0,25	0,00
Operations	Tools	1,58	0,83	0,25	0,50
Operations	Cryptography	2,25	1,00	0,75	0,50
Operations	Access Management	0,92	0,67	0,25	0,00
Operations	Patch Management	0,83	0,33	0,00	0,50
Operations	Vulnerability Management	1,17	0,67	0,25	0,25

Functions	Current
Policy and Leadership	2,17
People	1,25
Threats	1,08
Operations	1,35





### **Supervision and Sanctions**

Essential entities: ex ante Important entities: ex post Periodic scans, audits, inspections by supervising body or 3rd parties

suspend temporarily a certification

administrative fines maximum of at least EUR 7M or of a maximum of at least 1,4% of the total worldwide annual turnover

request that the relevant bodies, courts or tribunals, prohibit temporarily <u>any natural person</u> who is responsible for discharging managerial responsibilities at chief executive officer or legal representative level in the essential entity from exercising managerial functions in that entity (essential entities only)

#### SECTORS OF HIGH CRITICALITY (Annex I)

- Energy
- Transport
- Banking
- Financial Market Infrastructure
- Health
- Drinking water
- Waste Water
- Digital infrastructure
- ICT Service management
- Public Administration
- Space

#### **Other Critical SECTORS (Annex II)**

- Postal and courier services
- Waste management
- Chemical industry and supply chain
- Food supply chain
- Manufacturing (limited)
- Digital providers
  - Online marketplace
  - Search engines
  - Social networkingn services platforms
- Research organisations

SECTORS OF HIGH CRITICALITY (Annex I)	Other Critical SECTORS (Annex II)
• Energy	<ul> <li>Postal and courier services</li> </ul>
Transport	Waste management
• Bank 8. Digital infra-	— Internet Exchange Point providers
• Final	— DNS service providers, excluding operators of root name servers
• Heal	— TLD name registries
• Drinl	<ul> <li>Cloud computing service providers</li> </ul>
• Wast	— Data centre service providers
• Digit	<ul> <li>Content delivery network providers</li> </ul>
• ICT S	— Trust service providers
	— Providers of public electronic communications networks
Publ	— Providers of publicly available electronic communications services
• Space	Research organisations

# What CSIRTs can do

## NIS 2 Directive: cybersecurity improvement for all

😤 By Andrew Cormack 🛛 🛱 5 January 2023 🖓 🖓 No Comments

The final text of the revised <u>European Network and Information Security</u> <u>Directive (NIS 2 Directive)</u> has now been published. This doesn't formally apply in the UK, but does have some helpful comments on using data protection law to support network and information security. I've blogged about these previously but, since the final version significantly changes the draft numbering, I thought it was worth posting a revised index to those posts:

<u>CSIRT (international) Information Sharing</u>: Draft Recital 69, which encouraged incident response and information sharing, is now split across Recitals 120 and 121. The former is now even more explicit that "entities should be encouraged and assisted by Member States to collectively leverage their individual knowledge and practical experience at strategic, tactical and operational levels with a view to enhancing their capabilities to adequately prevent, detect, respond to or recover from incidents or to mitigate their

https://regulatorydevelopments.jiscinvolve.org/wp/2023/01/05/nis-2-directive-cybersecurity-improvement-for-all/

# What you need to do NOW!

- Find out what your position is and try to have that confirmed
- Establish contacts in government
- Establish a baseline position
  - Use the GÉANT security baseline or any other checklist to verify your status on the main security subjects
  - Identify weak spots and gaps



# What we can do together

- Share information (official documents and references)
  - https://wiki.geant.org/display/SIGISM/NIS-2+Directive
- Quick scans (confidential)
  - Half day quick scan based on GEANT Security Baseline (on basis of availability security officers in WP8)
  - Full day workshop baseline scan Baseline (on basis of availability security officers in WP8)
- Develop and share good practices and guidance
  - Processes and procedures
  - Model policies
  - Roadmaps
  - Limited options for translating good practices



# What we can do together, next steps SIG-ISM in cooperation with GN5-1 WP8

- SIG-ISM: Information Security Management
- Coordination, dissemination and expertise
- Share best practices
- What do we need from you?
  - Share information and best practices
  - ...
  - Assign a coordinator (CISO, Risk manager, Senior manager)
- Visit the wiki pages
  - Join SIG-ISM
  - Ask your CISO/Security officer/legal counselor
  - Ask your GÉANT partner relations representative
  - Ask the GN5-1 WP8 security team



# References

- NIS-2 Directive: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj
- SIG-ISM whitepaper on risk management: https://wiki.geant.org/display/SIGISM/SIG+ISM+white+paper+risk+management
- GÉANT Security Baseline: <u>https://security.geant.org/baseline/</u>
- NIS coordination group: <u>https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/nis-cooperation-group</u>
- "Single point of contact" for each Member State: https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc\_id=53682
- Technical Guideline: Security Measures for Top-Level-Domain Name Registries https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc\_id=84325
- Security toolbox for 5G networks: <a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cybersecurity-5g-networks-eu-toolbox-risk-mitigating-measures">https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cybersecurity-5g-networks-eu-toolbox-risk-mitigating-measures</a>
- Blogpost Andrew Cormack: <u>https://regulatorydevelopments.jiscinvolve.org/wp/2023/01/05/nis-2-directive-</u> <u>cybersecurity-improvement-for-all/</u>
- NIS-2 WIKI page: <a href="https://wiki.geant.org/display/SIGISM/NIS-2+Directive">https://wiki.geant.org/display/SIGISM/NIS-2+Directive</a> (under construction)





# Thank You

Any questions?

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