# Cloud Security Risks and their Mitigation

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#### Introduction

- This is in the context of the EGI federated cloud, activities within, and discussions we have had
- Some of this information is a bit sensitive, the version of the slides on the web is slightly different



### **EGI Federated Cloud**

- The EGI Federated Cloud has been operational since May 2014
- Currently 21 Cloud Resource Centres across Europe

https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/Federated\_Cloud\_infrastructure\_status

- ~7000 cores
- cf ~650,000 cores in the 'Grid'
- Access via the OGF OCCI standard interface

http://occi-wg.org/

• The various EGI security groups are working with the EGI Federated cloud to integrate the security activities



### EGI Security Threat Risk Assessment

- This activity was carried out towards the end of 2015, beginning of 2016
  - Report completed February 2016.
- Focus on the EGI Federated Cloud and the mitigations in place at that time
  - But general threats/risks included too
- Similar to the activity carried out in 2012
  - Talked about in Barcelona
  - Recently we used a similar methodology
- Work carried out in a spreadsheet, via audio conferencing, and by e-mail





- Step 1 Establish team
  - Not as easy as it sounds, everyone busy
- Step 2 Draft Threat and Threat Category Selection
  - Started from version from 2012
  - Tidied and added cloud specific categories
- Step 3 Assign team member to each category
  - Member improves list of threats
  - Establishes the current situation, mitigations in place
- Step 4 Agree list of threats
- Step 5 Ask everyone to go away with a spreadsheet, and rate 'Likelihood' and 'Impact' for each threat
  - between 1 and 5



# Methodology (2)

- Step 6 Gather in all spreadsheets, compute the average risk
  - For each person Risk = Likelihood \* Impact
  - Then take average of the risk
- Step 7 Discuss some of the threats
  - Those people wanted to highlight
  - Those which have a higher standard deviation in value
- Step 8 Suggest some further mitigations
  - We needs a lot more work on the cloud specific threats
- Step 9 Write report



# 1 important mitigation in the Fed Cloud

- Only 'endorsed' VM images are allowed to be run
  - People cannot run any image they wish
- VM images created by an expert (hopefully) and endorsed by the Virtual Organisation (VO) managers.
- This is probably the main reason we don't get masses of incidents
- But we get incidents
  - Bad endorsed VM
  - Bad contextualization for a generic VM



# **Summary of results**

- Selected 103 threats in 19 categories
  - Compared to 75 in 20 categories in 2012
- Some streamlining, plus added some new categories concerning the cloud
- 10 people returned a spreadsheet, all filled in all for nearly all threats
- Report 24 out of 103 have a value of 10 or more
  - Compared to 18 having value 8 or more in 2012
  - Half in this new assessment have risk 8 or more
- Risk values much higher
  - because we have less control over S/W, tech...??



### 4 main areas 'High' risk

- Security Incidents in the Federated Cloud
  - Detection, handling, etc.
- Software and Technology
  - Less control than in the past of what technology is in use, some may not be secure, may not be supported etc.
- Staffing levels and training
  - Insufficient staff to carry out security activities, not enough skills
- Policy and Adherence
  - People may not be aware of policy, or may ignore it, e.g. data protection



#### **Highest Risk Threat**

#### • Sorry not public



#### • Sorry not public

### More Cloud specific risks



### **Cloud Mitigations being worked on**

- Endorsed VAs is best we have
  - I reckon we would have a lot more incidents if this wasn't in place
- Contact e-mail lists for VM endorsers and VM operators
  - Don't have either of these yet
  - Useful for informing of vulnerabilities
- Software improvements for banning/suspending users
- SSC's related to the cloud



### **Cloud Mitigations (2)**

- Connectivity restrictions
- Monitoring
- Considering VM operator role, so only those with that role can instantiate VMs
  - At present anyone who is a member of VO which is cloud enabled can instantiate VMs
  - Most work done with VMs based on very specific VAs
  - In future imagine less privileged users will access VMs



#### **Other highest risk threats**

#### • Sorry not public



#### SW checklist

 We produced a checklist to try to make people think about what software they are writing or selecting

https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/SVG:Software\_Security\_Checklist



### Conclusion

- Our Security threat risk assessment wasn't as polished as it might be, but highlights a lot of the problems with federated infrastructures especially federated clouds
- Security risks are higher in the Cloud, we have less control over what people do, what software is in use, and who has privileged access
- We are doing some things in EGI to mitigate some of the risks, but collaboration with others would be great.



### **Report and slides**

- I will send you the report and spreadsheet if you wish, and agree to treat as 'AMBER'
- Request by E-mail me Linda.Cornwall at stfc.ac.uk

# Thank you for your attention.

#### **Questions?**



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### **Likelihood and Impact Guidelines**

- No statistics to do a proper actuarial probability and cost – so have to go with judgement, gut feeling, and some guidelines
- Guide to 'Likelihood' is
  - 1. Unlikely to happen
  - 2. May happen 2-3 times every 5 years
  - 3. Expected to happen once a year or so
  - 4. Happens every few months
  - 5. Happens once a month or more



# Guide to 'Impact' (Based on WLCG)

- 1. Minimal impact on EGI's ability to deliver its services to users or on any other asset.
- 2. Minor impact, such as some operational or financial costs, local service disruption of less than 1 week.
- 3. Serious localised disruption to some services for some users, for a week or more. Significant productivity loss, significant financial or operational cost. Or significant impact on other assets, such as reputation or people.
- 4. Serious multi-national disruption to some services to all users, for a week or more, leading to productivity loss, significant financial or operational cost. Serious damage to reputation of EGI.
- 5. Very serious disruption, where EGI is unable to deliver services to users for a week or more. Damage to reputation and/or third parties which may affect funding and continuity of the project.



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