This project investigates the usability of recently developed open-source and affordable Cryptech HSM modules for various usecases we have in use cases that exist within T&I in services delivered via GEANT project (eduGAIN, eduroam, eduTEAMS , and InAcademia) and generally for federation operations.

The goal of the CrypTech Cryptech project is to create an open-source hardware cryptographic engine that can be built by anyone from public hardware specifications and open-source firmware and operated without fees of any kind. The team working on the project is a loose international collective of engineers trying to improve assurance and privacy on the Internet. Several GEANT participating NRENs are principle investors and participants in this project.

The goal is to set up the Cryptech devices to allow for testing and to identify the initial use cases and the service teams who will be participating in the testing.

Please describe the goals of pilot, including activities, participants, the community(ies) that require a solution. Describe when the pilot is done and how to measure the success of it, in a SMART way.

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• Gather the requirements for HSM usage by GEANT T&I services and the T&I community.
• Investigate the usability of the Cryptech devices technically and functionally.
• Discuss our findings with the community and the Cryptech project team.
• We set up a testbed so service teams may test specific requirements against the devices. The testing itself is likely being done in a followup activity.

Please describe the technical details for this pilot.

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Top-down scheme of interests/work areas:

• Service needs and adoption path - Identifying (client) service-specific requirements, scenarios and usage patterns, in terms of use of the HSM platform and its supporting cryptoservice. Could extend towards actual implementation by some services.

• Interoperability - We want to test if and how the devices can be accessed in an interoperable way. Most likely way to achieve some level of interoperability is to stick to an API such as PKCS#11. Another possibility for service related software implementations that have a coarse internal crypto API of their own is to produce a mapping layer that would adapt to one of (finer-grained) APIs provided by the HSM platform.

• HSM platform and its working environment:
  
  • Technical features - Performance levels and direct interfaces offered by the platform, including implementations of widely used specs and standards and platform-specific operational functions for import/export of cryptographic materials, access to logs, health check, disaster recovery, clear/reset, etc. A detailed list of technical criteria for evaluation (depending on the use cases and requirements) could include:
    • Performance for key generation and signing, and for asymmetric and symmetric cryptography algorithms;
    • Support for key cryptographic algorithms - e.g. RSA, DSA, ECC, 3DES, AES, SHA-1, MD5, etc.;
    • Programmability of the device (ability to execute code within the secure boundary);
    • Key storage capacity;
    • Form factor and connectivity - PCI, USB, Ethernet, etc.;
    • Audit and management capabilities;
    • Operating system and application support;
    • Remote access mechanisms;
    • Provided/supported user and admin tools;
    • Crypto API support - PKCS#11, MSCAPI, KMIP, JCA, etc,;
    • Supported/used cryptomaterial formats.
      
      
  • Operational aspects - Procedures, their practicality and suitability for the environment where the platform is deployed, physical/electromagnetic security arrangements. A detailed list of operational criteria for evaluation (depending on the use cases and requirements) could include:
    • Redundancy capability - suitability of procedures in the event of device failure;
    • Physical and logical security mechanisms;
    • Authentication mechanisms for access and/or defining the 'master secret';
    • Certifications - FIPS 140-2 (Level), Common Criteria;
    • Suitability of vendor documentation;
    • Vendor support and maintenance policy - bug fixing, patches, etc.;
    • Vendor credibility - business model, stability, etc.
    • Cost of ownership.
      
      
• Trustworthiness of the HSM platform - How one can attest that the offered platform is secure; system integrity and hardware tamper resistance; preliminary audit/analysis/observations, supporting evidence, what is required or good to have/know, are there some recognised/possible weaknesses, open issues.