The purpose of the AARC Blueprint Architecture (BPA) is to provide set of interoperable architectural building blocks for software architects and technical decision makers, who are designing and implementing access management solutions for international research collaborations.This is the wiki space of the Working Group in the Architecture Area of the AARC Community and AEGIS. Participation in the working group is open to individuals who are interested in following and contributing to the evolution of the AARC Blueprint Architecture and its supporting Guideline documents. Discussions about the ongoing work of the WG take place in the aarc-architecture mailing list. The group holds a weekly call every other Monday at 14:00 CE(ST)
provide recommendations and guidelines for implementers, service providers and infrastructure operators on implementing scalable and interoperable AAIs across e-infrastructures and scientific communities
work on the evolution of the blueprint architecture, with a focus on identity provider / service provider (IdP/SP) proxies, scalable authorisation solutions for multi-service provider environments and other solutions for integrating with R&E federations and cross-sector AAIs
Column
width
20%
Column
width
40%
Video Call Calendar
Team Calendars
defaultView
list
id
56dbacde-65d0-4476-850a-ca9badca10fe
Active Draft Document
Guidelines
Documents
AARC1
ID
Title
Summary
Links
Status
AARC-
JRA1.4A
Guidelines on expressing group membership and role information
Information about the groups a user is a member of is commonly used by SPs to authorise user access to protected resources. Apart from the group information that is managed by the user’s home IdP, research communities usually operate their own group managing services. Such services often act as Attribute Authorities, maintaining additional information about the users, including VO membership, group membership within VOs, as well as user roles. It is therefore necessary that all involved SPs and IdPs/AAs can interpret this information in a uniform way. Specifically, the following challenges are addressed by this document:
Standardising the way group membership information is expressed, both syntactically and semantically
Indicating the entity that is authoritative for each piece of group membership information
Expressing VO membership and role information
Supporting group hierarchies in group membership information
G056
AARC profile for expressing community identity attributes
This document defines a profile for expressing the attributes of a researcher’s digital identity. The profile contains a common list of attributes and definitions based on existing standards and best practises in research & education. The attributes include identifiers, profile information, and community attributes such as group membership and role information.
Methods for establishing trust between OAuth 2.0 Authorization Servers
This document explores different approaches for establishing trust among entities such as OAuth 2.0 Authorization Servers (AS) and Resource Servers (RS) residing in distinct domains. These interactions are facilitated through trusted third parties referred to as Trust Anchors, which are entities issuing authoritative statements about entities that participate in an identity federation.
This specification extends the OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection (RFC7662) method to allow conveying meta-information about a token from an Authorization Server (AS) to the protected resource even when there is no direct trust relationship between the protected resource and the token issuer. The method defined in this specification, termed "proxied" token introspection, requires access tokens to be presented in JWT format containing the iss claim for identifying the issuer of the token. Proxied token introspection assumes that the AS which is trusted by the protected resource has established a trust relationship with the AS which has issued the token that needs to be validated.
This document explores the refresh token flow in a scenario where client applications interact with resource servers through interconnected OpenID Providers (OIDC). Specifically, it focuses on the case where an AARC-compliant Infrastructure Proxy [AARC-G045] acts as an intermediary between the client and a Community AAI. To address challenges related to refresh token handling in this configuration, the document specifies a secure refresh token flow that leverages introspection to ensure the validity of refresh tokens before issuing new access tokens. The document describes the flows for both obtaining and using refresh tokens.
Guideline on the exchange of specific assurance information between Infrastructures
Increasingly Research Infrastructures and generic e-Infrastructures compose an 'effective' assurance profile derived from several sources. The assurance elements may come from an institutional identity provider (IdP), from community-provided information sources, from step-up authentication services, and from controls placed upon the user, the community, or the Infrastructure Proxy through either policy or technical enforcement. Knowledge about the upstream source of either identity or authenticator can also influence the risk perception of the Infrastructure and result in a modification of the assurance level, e.g. because it has involved a social identity provider or perhaps a government e-ID. The granularity of this composite assurance profile is attuned to the risk assessment specific to the Infrastructure or Infrastructures, and is often both more fine-grained and more specific than what can reasonably be expressed by generic IdPs or consumed by generic service providers.
Yet it is desirable to exchange as complete as possible the assurance assertion obtained between Infrastructures, so that assurance elements need not be re-asserted or re-computed by a recipient Infrastructure or Infrastructure service provider.
This document describes the assurance profiles that are recommended to be used by the e-Infrastructures and research infrastructures AAI platforms to exchange user authentication information between infrastructures.
Guidelines for scalable and consistent authorisation across multi-SP environments
Managing authorisation at each SP individually does not scale (although in some case it might be required). So, how to do it? Provide guidelines on how one can manage authorisation across multiple SPs, possibly operated by different entities. For some cases centrally managed entitlements (conveying group/role membership for example) might be more than enough.
Requirements and guidelines for federated access to OIDC-based services in the context of research collaboration
(was: 1. Requirements and guidelines for SPs using alternative mechanisms and protocols for federated access. 2 OIDC Based Services in research)
ID
Title
Summary
Links
Status
...
This deliverable describes possible authorisation models for SAML-SPs and OIDC-RPs in a proxied environment. We provide an overview about available and upcoming technologies currently in use or development for community and research infrastructures.
Input is taken from the AARC pilots, such as the pilot for the Life Science AAI, experiences at WLCGCERN with VOMS as well as their current move towards token based approaches, and further examples from the federated research infrastructure / research community space. These user-community views are complemented by the experience of the first year of the AARC2 project, in which different levels of assurance, LoA step-up, account linking and various authorisation models have been analysed.
Establishing trust between OAuth 2.0 Authorization Servers
Specification for establishing trust among OAuth Proxies (based on AARC-I058)
Status
title
ON HOLD
AARC-G079
AARC Community-based Access Entity Category
This document provides guidelines for using the Community-based Access Entity Category to support the release of attributes to Service Providers that have a proven need to receive a set of community-managed information about their users in order to effectively provide their service to the users.
The goal of this document is to define how affiliation information should be expressed when transported across AARC BPA-compliant AAIs. Two different types of affiliation have been identified, namely Affiliation within the Home Organisation, such as a university, research institution or private company; and Affiliation within the Community, such as cross-organisation collaborations. Both affiliation types should be communicated to the service providers that rely on affiliation information in order to control access to resources. Will supersede AARC-G025
Best practices for integrating OpenID Connect / OAuth2 based end services
AARC2-JRA1.3.B "
Capture what OIDC-based services need to understand, which schemes to follow in order to benefit from federated identities, that currently are exclusively in the SAML world.
This will probably include pointers to documents that specify mappings between SAML and OIDC expression of attributes, entitlements or claims.
There is some overlap with
OIDC/OAuth2 client registration is covered in AARC-G032
Best practises for scalable account (de)provisioning of VO members
Best practises for scalable account provisioning, management, and deprovisioning, particularly from the perspective of the standard protocols used to manage accounts (such as LDAP, VOOT, SCIM, etc.)
Guidelines for registering OIDC Relying Parties in AAIs
for international research collaboration"
for international research collaboration
This document describes different ways to accomplish an OpenID Connect client registration, specifically providing guidance for International Research Collaborations that need to implement one of these systems.
Authentication-assurance-elevation requirements and guidelines for SPs in the context of international research collaboration
(was: 1. Step-up authentication requirements and guidelines for SPs, renamed in A holistic view on Assurance elevation)
This document collects use-cases and requirements from the communities to describe the current state of the field.
The goal is to also derive a common pattern to guide future implementations of Step-up authentication.
4A)
Roles, responsibilities and security considerations for VOs
DROPPED. Most of the content is now in DJRA1.3; it was proposed to gather the remaining information into a document describing how roles and the requirements on roles be managed (e.g. "there must always be a security contact"); however, we have decided that we will not have enough time to do justice to the topic.
Virtual Organisations (VOs) have several roles and responsibilities; some are identified as community responsibilities, and others arise from relations to infrastructures (e.g. security contact, technical contact). Can we minimise the number of places that need this information, in order to improve maintainability and scalability?
Guidelines for combining group membership and role information in multi-AA environments
When combining information from several AAs, one needs to consider the different semantics, different levels of assurance, and different purposes of the AAs and their attributes.
Requirements and Implementations for Authentication Freshness
(was: Guidelines for step-up authentication via forced reauthentication)
This document describes mechanisms for forcing a user to perform an additional login (reauthentication) in order to ensure that the user who is accessing a protected resource is the same person who initially authenticated at the start of the session. Forced reauthentication can therefore provide additional protection for sensitive resources.
federated access to non-web services across different operational domains
Status
title
Concept
Status
colour
Yellow
title
IN PROGRESS
AARC2-JRA1.3C
Guidelines for AAI interoperability with non-R&E Identity Providers in support of international research collaboration
Status
title
ABANDONED
AARC2-JRA1.3D
Guidelines for AAI interoperability with eIDAS Identity Providers in support of international research collaboration
Status
title
Concept
AARC2-JRA1.3E
AAI tools & technologies enabling OIDC for international research collaboration
AARC2-JRA1.4A
Roles, responsibilities and security considerations for VOs
Virtual Organisations (VOs) have several roles and responsibilities; some are identified as community responsibilities, and others arise from relations to infrastructures (e.g. security contact, technical contact). Can we minimise the number of places that need this information, in order to improve maintainability and scalability?
combining group membership and role information in multi-AA environments
When combining information from several AAs, one needs to consider the different semantics, different levels of assurance, and different purposes of the AAs and their attributes.
it was suggested this incorporate anything from JRA1.4A not included in DJRA1.3 plus guidance on evaluating and selecting a proxy platform. However, as we have too many documents already and not enough time to do them justice, JRA1 have decided to drop this document. However, EOSC Hub is currently (as of March 2019) putting together an evaluation form.
It was suggested at the F2F in April 2019 that this document be resurrected?
Status
title
ABANDONED
AARC2-JRA1.4C
Guidelines for scalable account (de)provisioning of VO members
AARC2-JRA1.4D
Guidelines for implementing, operating and using VO platforms