...
Of course, this still leaves open that social accounts can be shared and there is hardly any way to detect that one unless you are the OP yourself. So should social id NEVER result in ID/unique being asserted unless it has been post-processed in the Proxy? Or can we make something good off it nonetheless?
Discussion
See mail thread "[aarc-na3] Fwd: [appint] RAF ID component and combined assurance evaluation" in the NA3 list and AppInt.
Draft document for commenting: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1kpHFLnJH1zITj7J7BXDRSTwNpo3AyrXyPFtE_dCb7Dc/edit#
Guidance document
Infrastructure Proxies may convey assurance information derived from multiple sources, one of which may be ‘social identity’ sources. This guidance explains under which conditions combination of assurance information and augmentation of identity data within the Infrastructure Proxy should result in assertion of the REFEDS Assurance Framework components “unique identifier”, and when it may be appropriate to assert the “identity proofing” component value low.
Consolidated version for review: MS Word and PDF formats.
Discussion
See mail thread "[aarc-na3] Fwd: [appint] RAF ID component and combined assurance evaluation" in the NA3 list and AppInt.
Draft document for commenting: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1kpHFLnJH1zITj7J7BXDRSTwNpo3AyrXyPFtE_dCb7Dc/edit#