RADIUS/TLS: Obtaining and managing certificates
RADIUS over TLS is a new way of interconnecting federations (and later, if desired, eduroam IdPs and eduroam SPs). It uses TLS encryption instead of IP address and shared secret pairs to authenticate and authorise eduroam servers. When replacing such explicit configuration-based authorisation with a dynamic, automatic provisioning model, it is important to clearly define the rules for issuance of an eduroam server certificate, because the possession of the certificate will enable the holder to participate in eduroam.
In order to make use of this new feature, your FLR server must have acquired an eduroam server certificate. Depending on which federation or world region you are from, the procedures for getting a certificate will differ. The following two subsections are a globally valid description of the eduroam Trust Model. This trust model is currently only implemented by one CA, which operates in Europe. The last subsection provides details for European eduroam participants.
The eduroam server certificate trust model: eduPKI PMA and the eduroam Trust Profile
During the design of the X.509 trust model for eduroam, certain requirements had to be considered.
- It became clear that no single one Certificate Authority (CA) can or should issue all eduroam certificates world-wide. Instead, rules were defined under which multiple CAs can issue eduroam certificates.
- These CAs could possibly be general-purpose CAs that also manage certificates for other services besides eduroam. Consequently, the eduroam trust model had to allow to differentiate eduroam server certificates from other certificates from the same CA in a standardised manner.
- A CA would need to conform to certain quality assurance criteria, which need to be assessed by an oversight committee.
As a result of these requirements, the GEANT project's eduPKI task created a framework for the eduroam trust model:
- an oversight body, the "eduPKI Policy Management Authority" (eduPKI-PMA) was created and produced a document with defined Quality Assurance criteria for CAs which would like to become part of the eduroam trust model. The rules for CA accreditation are set forth in section "CA Accrediation Process" at https://www.edupki.org/edupki-pma/pma-governing-documents/. Note that eduPKI PMA is currently the only PMA, but this doesn't preclude other PMAs in other world regions from emerging.
- a X.509 trust profile for the eduroam service was created, which designates two so-called "policy OID" fields to eduroam IdP and SP servers. The trust profile can be found on this page: https://www.edupki.org/edupki-pma/edupki-trust-profiles/
- this trust profile requires that CAs which use this policy OID will check the authorisation of a certificate applicant whether or not he is actually an eduroam IdP and/or SP server operator.
This way, it can be assured that only authorised eduroam operators get eduroam certificates and can establish connections to other eduroam servers.
Managing accredited CAs in eduroam servers
The number of accredited CAs and the list of certificates can change at any time. It is important that all eduroam servers consult an up-to-date list of accredited CAs. The list of currently accredited CAs is maintained in a TERENA repository of the TACAR service. A browsable list can be found here: https://www.tacar.org/cert/list/
Please refrain from manually downloading CAs as a one-time action. Otherwise, your CA list will eventually become outdated and this will create service disruption for some eduroam users!
There is currently one accredited Certification Authority: the eduPKI CA, located at https://www.edupki.org/edupki-ca/ . eduPKI CA acts as a catch-all world-wide for eduroam participant countries which do not have their own accredited CA for the eduroam service. Such further CAs are welcome to apply for eduPKI PMA accreditation.
eduroam operators should request their eduPKI CA eduroam certificate by following the instructions on the eduPKI CA eduroam RA pages at: http://www.eduroam.org/index.php?p=europe&s=edupki
Updating CRLs on your server
Since certificate possibly need to be revoked in case of private key compromise or other reasons, it is important that all RADIUS servers which validate eduroam-accredited CAs consult an up-to-date CRL list for each of the CAs. eduroam suggests to use the script "FetchCRL3" which was developed in the Grid community for this very purpose (download here).
- place the .info files of all accredited CAs into one otherwise empty directory ( download edupki.info ) - let's assume for this example that the path to those files is
- find out the command which restarts your RADIUS server on your system - let's assume for this example that the command is
systemctl restart radiusd.service
- The following command will attempt to fetch an up-to-date CRL for the CA, and only if successful, will restart your server:
fetch-crl -l /path/to/certificates/ && systemctl restart radiusd.service
This script should be executed in a cron job on a regular basis (we suggest daily).
Many operating systems support IEEE 802.1X and EAP authentication, but the user interfaces in supplicants differ significantly. For some supplicants, manually clicking through a series of GUI pages is the only option. This is sometimes tedious for end users.
If possible, an IdP administrator should prepare pre-configured packages which contain the necessary information to securely connect to eduroam:
- the SSID: "eduroam"
- the crypto setting: WPA2/AES
- the EAP type setting
- the CA that issued the eduroam IdP server's EAP server certificate
- the Common Name in the eduroam IdP server's EAP server certificate
The following sections describe a series of tools that can be used to create such auto-installers. The use of one these windows 10 drivers update is recommended, because it will likely have a positive effect on user uptake, and reduce helpdesk load.
PLEASE ADD TEXT
PLEASE ADD TEXT
PLEASE ADD TEXT
Devices that are compatible with eduroam
The following list is sorted alphabetically by vendors. The table notes which EAP methods are supported. Legend:
CAT - this device/EAP type combination is supported by eduroam CAT; can probably also be configured securely manually
Yes - the device can be configured securely manually for this EAP type
Deficient - the device lacks important security features, but workarounds exist which can make its use safe
Insecure - the device can be configured manually for this EAP type, but not all security parameters can be set up
No - device is known not to support IEEE 802.1X/EAP
? - Unknown
TPS - supported with Third-Party Software (possibly commercial)
Samsung Galaxy S2
Huawei Sonic u8650
|Apple||Mac OS X||10.7+||CAT||CAT||CAT||Yes||No||?||Yes|
|Apple||Mac OS X||10.4-10.6||Yes||Yes||Yes||Yes||No||?||Yes|
|Microsoft||Windows||8 / 8.1||CAT||CAT||CAT||CAT||CAT||?|
 Installation and pinpointing of CA possible; verification of expected server name (CN) not possible. A secure configuration is only possible if the Identity Provider deploys a private CA which issues exclusively server certificates for his own eduroam EAP servers. All other Identity Provider deployments are INSECURE.
 Version 1.0 or higher required
 Verifying that the server is signed by the proper CA is not possible; this means users will not be able to detect fake hotspots and might send their username/password to an unauthorised third party.
 Only with 10.6.x (Snow Leopard) and later does OSX allow the configuration of of CA/server trust settings (Pinning 802.1X to specific CA and RADIUS server CommonName)
Reporting a new device
Please let us know in the "Comments" field what device you have, and what EAP method(s) you have found working. We will update the list periodically.