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For example, OS1 has several subcomponents, many of which you may have or not to different levels.
I propose a mean of no combined score (Adam Slagell).
Standardize Language
The spreadsheet and SCIv1 document have ambiguities. For example, one refers to service providers and another to service operators.
Base-level Examples
There are always questions of scope and completeness in filling out this evaluation form. While no implementation or documentation is ever exhaustive or covers every corner case, if there are significant holes then filling in noting the scope that is covered in the form is useful. For example, there may be centrally managed services for an infrastructure, while there are shared infrastructure at the resource providers that follow different policies. Or there may be different policies for different tiers of infrastructure worth noting.
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Examples of an authentication model might be a Kerberos system or PKI use to identify users. Other things Another piece that may be included in an authentication model is how one federates with other identity providers.
Authorization models might include something like VOMS or a central database to manage allocations and a corresponding process to decide which projects or communities get allocations and how they can authorize their users. Another important process is how PIs authorize who can be on their projects.
Access control example Dave?
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Examples of compliance mechanisms are top-level security policies, resource provider agreements, and terms of service that allow the organization to enforce policies for entities bypassing the model. For example, a resource provider setting up a gateway which bypasses authentication and authorization by sharing an account might be cut off from resources for breaking the model.
Dave, does this just duplicate OS7?
[OS2]
A process that ensures that security patches in operating system and application software are applied in a timely manner, and that patch application is recorded and communicated to the appropriate contacts.
A simple patch management process might be regular vulnerability scans, with a process to assign tickets to owners, and regular reviews of tickets to ensure that they are resolved within timelines following specified security policies. Sometimes this may be the responsibility of the the distributed infrastructure, but other times it may be part the responsibility of the the service operators. Patch management policies may differ for different classes of resources, too.
Recording and communication could be as simple as assigning tickets to appropriate service operators.
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This item differs from the patch management process in that it is about software owned or distributed by the infrastructure to the resource providers. In OS2 we might be talking about an XSS flaw in the a central user portal or website for the infrastructure, whereas her here we might be talking about accounting or job submission software pushed out to all the service operators.
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This does not mean the ability is there to detect all kinds of attacks or prevent them. It could be something as simple as detecting brute-force login attempts or compromised accounts and a mechanisms to lockout accounts manually or automatically.
Dave, I don't know how useful this is without agreeing on a few required threats and actions. Maybe you should be able to block IPs or networks, detect brute-force attacks, lockout accounts, and detect compromised accounts. I don't know what others count as significant.
[OS5]
The The capability to regulate the access of authenticated users.
There simply needs to be a way to suspend access and terminate existing sessions and jobs in an emergency.
Dave, how does this differ from OS7?
[OS6]
The capability to identify and contact authenticated users, service providers and resource providers.
Identifying users could be as simple as having unique usernames tied to email addresses. Each resource provider should have a contact for security incidents recorded in a central place as well as the admin for each service. This could simply be a spreadsheet in a shared location.
[OS7]
The capability to enforce the implementation of the security policies, including an escalation procedure, and the powers to require actions as deemed necessary to protect resources from or contain the spread of an incident.
Enforcement may just be the ability to remove individuals and resource providers from the infrastructure for violating policies. Resource providers might locally still allow a user even if removed from the infrastructure.
An escalation procedure could simply be a chain of command to escalate noticed policy violations to senior levels of management with the authority to censure violators.
Emergency powers could simply be a way for incident response teams to disable accounts directly or remove authorizations for the infrastructure. Even if they cannot remove all access at a single resource provider, they should be able to remove users from centralized authentication, authorization and access control to control limit the spread of an instance. For example, they might revoke certificates for this and access from to a user portal for a user, while the individual resource providers retain control of local credentials to other services. Critically, an infrastructure should be able to contain a compromise to their infrastructure and from spreading to other infrastructures, .e.g, by revoking certificates or disabling accounts in their identity provider.
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